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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines responses to a national FDA advisory that urged at-risk individuals to limit 
store-bought fish consumption due to the dangers of methyl-mercury. We investigate consumer 
response using both parametric and nonparametric methods. Some targeted consumers 
significantly reduced canned fish purchases as a result of the advisory, suggesting that 
information-based policies can achieve the issuing agency’s goals. Education and newspaper 
readership were important determinants of response, suggesting that information acquisition and 
assimilation are key factors for risk avoidance. While some groups reduced consumption as a 
result of the advisory, we do not find a response among the relatively large group of at-risk 
households which met neither the education nor readership criteria. The advisory also had 
unintended spillover effects; some consumers not considered at-risk reduced consumption in 
response to the advisory. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Information provision is an integral part of many state and federal programs to mitigate 
environmental and public health dangers. Examples include the toxics release inventory, lead 
paint disclosures, drinking water quality notices, food nutritional labeling, and product safety 
warnings. This paper examines the determinants of consumer response to one such information 
policy, the 2001 FDA methyl-mercury fish advisory. 
Government agencies maintain that mercury exposure from environmental pollution is a 
prominent public health risk. A 2001 Center for Disease Control (CDC) study found that one in 
ten American women of childbearing age has elevated levels of mercury in her blood. At current 
agency reference doses and margins of safety, the CDC findings suggest that every year at least 
85,000 U.S. children are born at risk of neurological damage from mercury exposure. As the 
consumption of contaminated fish is the primary source of environmental exposure to mercury, it 
is a health risk that households could readily limit. Young children, nursing mothers, and 
pregnant women are the most susceptible to mercury toxicity. 
Reducing mercury exposure among at-risk groups requires reduced fish consumption 
because mercury persists in the environment. Even completely eliminating emissions would not 
eliminate mercury risks in the near term.1 In January 2001, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) issued a commercial fish consumption advisory that warned of the health hazards from 
mercury and urged at-risk individuals to limit fish consumption. Changes in consumption patterns 
following this first major national mercury advisory are the focus of our study. 
To what extent did the FDA advisory reduce exposure to at-risk groups? We address the 
question by examining household-level fish consumption from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX). Specifically, we analyze how certain groups’ consumption of canned fish products 
changed in response to the advisory. An advisory can only achieve the issuing agency’s goals if 
                                                 
1 Domestic emissions controls alone are unlikely to eliminate the risk, even in the long term, because many 
fish are imported. Further, mercury emissions from foreign sources may be deposited into U.S. waters. 
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consumers are aware of it and are willing and able to translate awareness into behavior. We 
therefore focus on proxies for access to information and ability to assimilate information, which 
are suggested by the literature as response predictors. For example, since news readership is a 
proxy for information acquisition, we investigate differential responses among readers and non-
readers. Education serves as a proxy for both information acquisition and assimilation, so we 
investigate differential responses among educated and less educated consumers. We also 
investigate health choices since they may serve as a proxy for access to health information. 
We address consumption response empirically with a regression analysis and non-
parametric tests. Our simplest non-parametric analysis is a comparison of means before and after 
the advisory for various groups. We also use a difference-in-differences comparison of means 
approach to sweep out overall consumption shocks not directly attributable to the advisory, 
statistically mimicking a control group correction. A limitation of these standard mean tests is 
that they focus only on measures of central tendency. To provide a broader view of consumer 
response, we apply quantile treatment effect (QTE) analyses. We also extend the QTE tests to the 
difference-in-differences framework in order to provide robustness to common shocks.     
We find three main results. First, information-based policies can be effective. We find 
that targeted consumers most likely to be aware of and to understand the advisory responded by 
significantly reducing fish consumption on average. Second, information policies have 
pronounced distributional consequences; certain groups are more exposed to methyl-mercury 
simply because advisories do not “reach” them. We find that a large group of at-risk consumers, 
including the least educated, did not respond to the advisory. Third, information advisories 
produce significant unintended spillover effects. We find that some consumers did reduce 
consumption because of the advisory, despite not being considered at-risk in the advisory. 
This is the first economic study of advisory-induced consumer responses for store-bought 
fish, the primary source of mercury exposure to the public. The most closely related research 
measured responses of recreational anglers to localized safety advisories. See, for example, 
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Belton et al. (1986) and May and Berger (1996). Using assumptions based on such recreational 
demand studies, Jakus, McGuinness, and Krupnick (2002) developed health and welfare benefit 
estimates of a striped bass advisory to Chesapeake Bay anglers. 
This study extends a broader literature on public advisories as a policy tool. Adler & 
Pittle (1984) have a pessimistic view of the efficacy of advisories in practice. It is debated 
whether even the surgeon general’s warning for tobacco was in and of itself a “watershed event” 
(Fenn et al. (2001) and Sloan et al. (2002)). Our findings indicate that advisories can achieve the 
issuing agency’s goals, but the short-run response is nuanced. Some sectors of the at-risk 
population strongly respond, while others respond minimally, if at all. Readership and education 
are the primary response predictors. 
This research also makes a contribution to the product and food safety literature. 
Experimental work by Viscusi et al. (1986) shows that, given information about product hazards, 
subjects undertake precautionary behavior generally consistent with basic economic theory. Our 
research confirms these experimental findings in a revealed preference setting. In previous 
empirical work, Foster and Just (1989) (milk), Brown and Shrader (1990) (eggs), and Kinnucan et 
al. (1997) (meat) all show that adverse health information is correlated with reductions in overall 
consumption. These studies were based on aggregate data. Our data allow us to disentangle 
information-related response determinants at the household level. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II examines the context for our analysis. Parts A 
and B review sources of mercury exposure, health consequences, and key policy milestones. Part 
C presents a brief conceptual framework for investigating household health and consumption 
decisions. Section III summarizes our consumer expenditure data. Section IV examines several 
methodological approaches, each with their own strength. Graphical analyses, non-parametric 
statistical tests, and a standard parametric analysis are included. Section V presents our results by 
answering a series of key questions. Finally, section VI concludes by interpreting our results for 
economics and policy. 
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II. Background 
A. Sources and Consequences of Mercury Exposure 
 
Levels of mercury circulating in the environment have increased considerably over the 
last century. Coal-fired electrical plants are currently the largest source of anthropogenic mercury. 
Mercury binds with sulfuric compounds in coal, and burning releases the mercury into the 
atmosphere. When atmospheric mercury is deposited into surface water, bacteria convert the 
mercury into organic methylmercury. It then enters a fish’s bloodstream from water passing over 
gills and accumulates in the tissues. Methylmercury bio-accumulates up the food chain. Even in 
water where ambient mercury levels are extremely low, mercury concentrations may reach high 
levels in predatory species like tuna, mackerel, and shark.  
For the general public, fish consumption is the primary source of exposure to mercury. 
Cooking and other forms of preparation do not mitigate exposure. Once consumed, mercury is a 
neurotoxin, which is absorbed into the bloodstream. In adults, abnormally high concentrations 
can contribute to brain damage, heart disease, blurred vision, slurred speech, and other 
neurological ailments. Such concentrations in adults are rare. However, the FDA maintains that 
even modest mercury concentrations pose a risk of significant harm to the developing 
neurological systems of fetuses, infants, and children. Consequences may include learning and 
attention disorders, or generally slow intellectual and behavioral development, as well as severe 
neurological illnesses such as cerebral palsy. Fetuses and nursing infants are at risk because 
mercury readily passes through the placenta, concentrates in umbilical tissues, and leaches into 
breast milk.  
 
B. Mercury & Public Policy  
Mercury has recently drawn considerable regulatory scrutiny. For example, the Clean Air 
Mercury Rule was touted as “the first ever national cap on mercury emissions.” Similarly, the 
EPA has established power plant mercury emissions standards as a top national priority. 
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However, even very strict standards cannot eliminate mercury exposure because mercury persists 
in the environment. Further, most large fish consumed domestically are caught abroad. For these 
reasons, demand-side consumer policy is, and will remain, an important tool for managing 
mercury exposure.  
 Major milestones in consumer policy are reported in Figure 1.2 There was a period in 
which government agencies maintained that mercury consumption risks were minimal. Indeed, 
FDA scientists counseled in 1994 that “normal patterns of consumption” do not pose a health 
threat. This official stance persisted until mid-2000, when the FDA weighed the cumulative 
findings of an EPA report (1997) and a National Academy of Sciences (June 2000) study that 
asserted significant dangers from consuming contaminated fish. In August of 2000, the FDA 
announced it was considering a new methyl-mercury advisory and solicited comment. 
The FDA formally released the new mercury advisory on January 12, 2001.3 The 
advisory singled out infants, small children, pregnant or nursing mothers, and women who may 
become pregnant. It states in part, “…. the primary danger from methylmercury in fish is to the 
developing nervous system of the unborn child, it is prudent for nursing mothers and young 
children not to eat these fish as well.” The advisory named several large fish that these targeted 
consumers should avoid entirely. More generally, it stated that consumers should limit their 
consumption of all fish, including canned fish, to no more than 12 ounces per week (less than two 
average meals). This advisory was an unusual response by the FDA; while agency inspections, 
                                                 
2 Figure 1 and the accompanying discussion emphasize consumption advisories for fish commercially 
caught and marketed. EPA and state advisories for methylmercury contamination in locally, recreationally 
caught fish have been periodically issued as well. Due to their relatively limited scope and scale, we 
consider these recreational advisories of secondary importance. The interested observer may wish to check 
the EPA’s ‘Local Fish Advisory Programs’ page at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/fish/states.htm .  
3 Our analysis compares pre-advisory to post-advisory consumption. While the advisory occurred on a 
specific date, we account for the possibility that dissemination and consumption responses occurred with 
some delay. In a sensitivity analysis, we also address the possibility that the advisory or its content was 
anticipated. 
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approvals, and sanctions are common, this type of broad and direct consumer campaign was, and 
remains, very rare.4 
 
Figure 1. Consumer Policy Milestones 
 
Time Period Consumer Advisory Policy Event 
  
Sept. 1994 FDA Releases ‘FDA Consumer’ … “Eating commercially available fish 
should not be a problem.” 
Dec. 1997 EPA Releases ‘Mercury Study Report to Congress’ … “A snapshot of our 
current understanding of mercury.” 
1998-2000 Interest groups and the EPA debate the appropriate reference dose for 
mercury exposure and policy decisions. 
June 2000 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Releases ‘Toxicological Effects of 
Methylmercury’ … “60,000 U.S. children may be at risk.” 
Aug-Dec 2000 FDA debates existence and language of new consumer advisory, soliciting 
comments from consumer advocates, public health professionals, 
environmental groups, and industry organizations. Focus groups conducted.  
Jan 2001 FDA issues new consumption advisory stating that pregnant women, 
women of childbearing age, and young children should limit consumption 
of all fish, and should not eat fish known to contain high levels of mercury. 
Jan-Mar 2001 Phase I of FDA Mercury Advisory Education Plan. 
Jan-Dec 2002 Phase II of FDA Mercury Advisory Education Plan. 
  
 
 The FDA’s outreach program consisted of a two-phase information campaign. Over the 
course of three months following the advisory, the FDA communicated its message by releasing 
pre-prepared newsprint and television press releases. Similar media kits were sent to weekly print 
news sources, parenting magazines, and women’s health periodicals. Phase I of the information 
campaign also included letters to physicians and health organizations. Phase II was a 
methodologically similar, but less intense, “reminder” campaign conducted in 2002.  
 
C. Household Health and Consumption Decisions 
 
Household consumption is a function of perceived risk, along with price, demographics, 
and other such factors. We consider changes in perceived risk due to the advisory in a well-
                                                 
4 FDA inspections can identify localized public health threats, and product- or location- specific 
consumption advisories are not infrequent. For example, the FDA recently publicized a number of branded 
almond recalls due to the possibility of salmonella enteriditis contamination. Advisories specifically 
advocating the reduction or elimination of certain foods are rare.  
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established framework for evaluating consumption decisions in the presence of health 
information. In seminal works, Michael Grossman (1972a, 1972b) applied the household 
production function approach of Lancaster (1966) to health and health capital, which serve as 
production “commodities”. Health information is viewed as an input in the household production 
function, and factors that impact a household’s perceived risk due to health information enter as 
demand shifters. Consequently, household consumption is a function C (PR, P, D …) of 
perceived risk PR, prices P, demographics D, and other factors. 
Characteristics impacting a household’s perceived risk are based upon the health and 
consumption literature. Grossman (1972a) hypothesizes that educated households may be likely 
to process information more efficiently. Further, one proxy for access to health information might 
be healthy choices made in other consumption areas like fruits, vegetables, and tobacco. Finally, 
as Ippolito and Mathios (1990) point out, if health information is concentrated in the news and 
print media, agents who regularly read news sources will face lower information acquisition costs 
and so are more likely to absorb the relevant risk warning. Consequently, a household’s perceived 
risk is a function PR (E, R, HC | T, A) of education E, news readership R, and health choices HC, 
that is conditioned on target status T, and advisory status A.  Substituting the perceived risk 
function into the household consumption function then implies that consumption is affected by 
these same factors. 
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III. Data 
A. CEX Diary Surveys 
 
 Our research assesses the impact of the FDA advisory on consumption of canned fish. 
We analyze data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). This 
annual survey asks a cross-section of households to record all expenditures over a two-week 
period in daily diaries. We sum these data to reflect total household purchases of each item over 
the sample period.  
  Using the CEX diaries offers a number of advantages. First, CEX data are widely used 
for economic and statistical analyses. Second, the unit of observation is the household, allowing 
us to account for a diverse set of demographic and expenditure variables.5 Third, CEX households 
are geographically diverse, and weighting allows the dataset to approximate a nationally 
representative sample. Finally, purchase snapshots provide unbiased estimates of consumption. 
 
B. Sample & Definitions 
 
The most direct measure of fish consumption in the CEX is expenditure on canned fish. 
We choose canned fish because it is widely consumed, it was specified in the advisory language, 
and data are readily available. To translate expenditures into quantities, we divide by price. We 
use the BLS regional average price for canned tuna by month, since the CEX does not contain 
price information.6 We construct an adult-equivalence scaling factor for tuna consumption by 
regressing total in-home meat consumption on the number of adults, babies, young children, 
medium-aged children, and old children living in the household. Adults are normalized to one, 
and children are scaled accordingly.7 Since the mercury advisory may induce changes in the 
                                                 
5  Datasets tracking landings and exports are available, but these contain no household-level data. Further, 
these aggregate statistics reflect institutional as well as household consumption and do not account for 
possible warehousing. 
6 Tuna has consistently comprised over 80% of canned fish consumption over the last decade. The ratio of 
canned tuna consumption to other canned fish has remained quite stable. 
7 Children ages 1 to 5 consume approximately 24 percent of an adult’s meat consumption, children ages 6 
to 11 consume 39 percent of an adult’s meat consumption, and children ages 12 to 18 consume 61 percent 
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decision to consume and the quantity conditional on consuming, our analysis considers three 
separate indicators: total consumption, a consumption decision indicator, and consumption 
conditional on non-zero expenditures. 
The literature and our conceptual framework suggest that demographics, education, news 
readership, and health choices may be important determinants of information response. Since 
households with young or nursing children are directly targeted by the advisory, our analysis 
includes a dummy for the presence of children ages 0-5. Our analysis also includes a dummy for 
college graduates, a dummy for newspaper or magazine purchases, and an ad-hoc proxy index for 
health choices. We consider households ‘health conscious’ if their food expenditure share of fresh 
fruits of and vegetables is larger than 70 percent of demographically similar households, and have 
no tobacco expenditures.8  
One of our objectives is to sweep out consumption shocks not directly attributable to the 
advisory. The ideal reference households will not have young or nursing children and will be less 
educated, non-readers, and less health conscious. The ideal reference group would also be as 
similar demographically to our target group as possible, save the presence of young or nursing 
children. Therefore, in order to construct the most comparable reference group, our sample only 
includes traditional households (we exclude multiple adult households headed by single people or 
households with three or more adults). Similarly, because the advisory targets pregnant women, 
women of child-bearing age, and young children, we restrict our analysis to households where the 
woman (if present) is no older than 45.9 
                                                                                                                                                 
of an adult’s meat consumption. Our method for constructing these factors follows USDA practices (Lino 
2004). 
8 This breakpoint is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. In a later sensitivity analysis, we confirm that our 
results are robust over a range of variable definitions. 
9 Our data do not allow us to identify directly women who are or may become pregnant.  Presented results 
omit childless married women, the control demographic most likely to be pregnant or become pregnant in 
the near future (that is not already identifiable as target). As a sensitivity analysis, we confirmed that this 
relatively small demographic group responded similarly to other targeted consumers. 
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Our sample covers the period 1999-2002; two years before and after the FDA advisory. 
Observations are approximately evenly distributed over the sample period: there are 5297 two 
week household expenditure snapshots in the two years prior to the advisory and 5240 
expenditure observations in the two years after the advisory.10  
 
C. Summary Statistics 
 
Summary statistics and variable definitions are presented in Table 1. The table illustrates 
the stability of household demographic composition over time. All nine variables reflecting 
households’ physical composition, news purchases, education, and health consciousness have 
similar means before and after the warning. Average changes are an order of magnitude smaller 
than their standard deviations. This suggests that variability in consumption behavior over time is 
unlikely to be attributable to variability in sample composition. 
The statistics in Table 1 also show that average aggregate canned fish quantity was 
approximately 8.5 percent higher after the advisory than before. This is of course consistent with 
the price drop illustrated in the table. Shares, which incorporate both prices and quantities, 
remained relatively constant over time. The ensuing analysis does account for underlying price 
movements and other potential common shocks; we examine changes in expenditure patterns for 
sub-populations relative to relevant control sub-populations. 
 
                                                 
10 Our sample of interest excludes households with incomplete diaries (about 3 percent of the original data) 
and households that report no in-home food purchases for the diary period (about 4 percent of the original 
data). Further, we omit households with more than twelve members total and those with per-capita 
quantities more than four standard deviations above the mean for households with positive fish 
expenditures. These latter two categories represent approximately 0.2 percent of the data. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 11 
                        ENTIRE               PRE-                   POST-   
             SAMPLE         ADVISORY       ADVISORY 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
        
PURCHASED? Dummy; ‘1’ if canned fish 
purchased in 2-week diary 
period, ‘0’ otherwise 
0.168 0.374 0.169 0.375 0.167 0.373 
QUANTITY Canned Fish Quantity (lbs.) 0.264 0.758 0.252 0.724 0.275 0.789 
 Quantity Conditional on 
Purchase (lbs.) 
1.57 1.17 1.49 1.12 1.64 1.21 
SHARE Canned Fish Expenditure 
Share 
.004 0.017 .004 0.016 .004 0.017 
 Share Conditional on 
Purchase 
.026 0.033 .025 0.032 .027 0.034 
PRICE Real Regional Price (per lb.) 1.94 0.155 2.02 0.139 1.86 0.133 
SUB PRICE Index of Substitute Prices –  
Base Period Normalized to 1 
1.09 0.057 1.04 0.030 1.14 0.034 
FOOD Real In-home Food 
Expenditures ($100s) 
1.15 0.967 1.15 0.974 1.14 0.961 
AGE Age of Respondent 38.8 13.4 38.6 13.4 38.9 13.3 
CHILDREN Dummy; HH with 
Young/Nursing Child? 
0.303 0.458 0.306 0.461 0.300 0.458 
READER Dummy; Newspaper or 
Magazine Purchase? 
0.242 0.428 0.249 0.432 0.235 0.424 
EDUCATED Dummy; Respondent 
College Graduate?  
0.299 0.458 0.290 0.454 0.308 0.462 
HEALTHY Dummy; Particularly 
Healthy Household?  
0.225 0.418 0.225 0.418 0.225 0.418 
RCHILD Reader/Children Interaction 0.078 0.268 0.081 0.273 0.074 0.262 
ECHILD Educated/Children 
Interaction 
0.097 0.296 0.093 0.290 0.101 0.301 
HCHILD Healthy/Children Interaction 0.076 0.266 0.079 0.270 0.074 0.262 
PERSONS Number of Equivalent 
Adults 
1.90 0.906 1.91 0.908 1.90 0.905 
        
 
                                                 
11 Summary Statistics Weighted in Standard Manner. ‘Persons’ is not directly a variable in the model, but is 
used for demographic scaling. 
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IV. Empirical Methods 
 
 Our empirical analysis addresses the following questions: First, did the groups targeted 
by the FDA mercury advisory language reduce their consumption in response to the advisory? 
Second, what are the determinants of advisory response?  Did news readership influence 
consumption choices? Did education levels influence consumption choices? Did health 
consciousness influence consumption choices?   
 We address these questions using a sequence of three fundamentally connected 
approaches: graphs, non-parametric statistical tests directly corresponding to the graphs, and 
regressions which extend the non-parametrics. First, we simply illustrate changes in the empirical 
distribution of pre- and post-advisory consumption by visual inspection of a graph. The graphs 
provide easily interpretable intuition about changes both in mean consumption and in the overall 
distribution of consumption.  Of course, graphical analysis does not account for statistical noise. 
So second, we employ non-parametric statistical tests which formalize the intuition of the 
graphical analysis. Using a difference-in-differences approach to control for unobserved shocks, 
we test for changes in mean consumption.  Similarly, we use a control approach to evaluate 
changes in the overall distribution of consumption, as measured by quantile treatment effects.12 
Third, we extend the non-parametric comparison of means approach with standard regression 
analysis. Each comparison of means can, in fact, be calculated as a simplified regression based on 
a limited set of covariates. Regression essentially runs the comparison of means simultaneously, 
accounting for potential correlations in the full set of covariates.  In this sense, the non-parametric 
tests can be viewed as a simple statistical bridge between a visual inspection and a full regression 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
12 See Heckman et al. (1997) and Bitler et al. (2005, 2006) for quantile treatment effects. Millimet et al. 
(2004) provides an example of a difference-in-differences distributional analysis.  
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A. Graphically Comparing Cumulative Distribution Functions 
 
 Our analysis of each question begins with a graphical presentation of fish expenditure 
shares. We compare post-advisory empirical cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) with pre-
advisory cdfs. If, on average, households meaningfully altered their behavior after the advisory, 
the post-advisory cdf will differ from the pre-advisory cdf ceteris paribus.13 Given a fixed 
quantile q, a horizontal shift to the left indicates that q percent of households now consume at or 
below a smaller expenditure share. Thus, a broad shift to left indicates that consumers reduced 
their consumption. Alternatively, a shift to the right signifies increased consumption.  
 Changes in empirical cdfs can be difficult to identify visually in absolute cdf graphs. For 
this reason, we present graphs such as Figure 2, which plot the horizontal difference between pre- 
and post- advisory consumption cdfs. For these difference graphs, negative expenditure share 
differences indicate a leftward shift in the post-advisory empirical cdf and positive expenditure 
share differences indicate a rightward shift in the post-advisory cdf. In graphs such as Figure 2, 
negative values imply a decrease in consumption and positive values imply an increase in 
consumption.  
 Since the area to the left of any cdf, to the right of the vertical axis, and below probability 
1 can be interpreted as a mean (here, mean fish expenditure share), the integrated area between 
the horizontal zero-axis and the cdf difference curve can be interpreted as the change in mean 
consumption between the pre- and post- advisory periods. The areas below the axis contribute 
towards a reduction in mean consumption after the advisory, and the areas above the axis 
contribute towards an increase. In Figure 2, areas both above and below the horizontal axis are 
quite small. It therefore appears that average fish expenditure shares over all demographic groups 
did not change significantly after the advisory.  
 
 
                                                 
13 To be precise, the weighted empirical cdfs will differ. Throughout our analyses, all graphical data include 
probability weights.  
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                                    Figure 2. Difference Graph: Entire Sample         
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Figure 2 demonstrates that aggregate fish shares over all expenditure groups did not 
significantly change after the advisory. The figure presents the horizontal difference 
between the pre- and post-advisory empirical cdfs. At every quantile with positive fish 
consumption, the difference is quite close to 0. 
 
B. Non-parametric Statistical Tests 
Mean Comparisons 
 
Since the information in the graphs represents differences in means, we use simple 
statistical methods to formally test graphical insights. For example, we could test the mean 
reduction in the overall share of food expenditures allocated to fish. For subscript 0 indicating 
‘pre-advisory’, subscript 1 indicating ‘post-advisory,’ and X indicating mean fish expenditure 
share, this test statistic would be X0 -X1, and its value corresponds to the net sum of the integrated 
areas in Figure 1.   
Of course, changes in fish consumption over time may not be fully attributable to the 
mercury advisory. For example, canned fish prices, substitute prices, and advertising expenditures 
all changed over this time period. Therefore, we “sweep out” these common by computing a 
difference-in-differences of means (DDM). For example, we will examine consumption responses 
of demographic groups directly targeted by the advisory language, after netting out consumption 
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changes for demographic groups untargeted by the advisory.  Formally, we examine the inter-
group difference of the intra-group changes in mean consumption. 14 
This technique can best be understood by a simple example.  Consider two basic sub-
groups of our data: those targeted, families with young children, and those not targeted.  We wish 
to isolate the impact of the mercury advisory on targeted families (∆advisory), while controlling for 
other potential factors such as advertising campaigns or changes in price that affect both targeted 
and non-targeted sub-groups equally (∆common).  Using the non-targeted group as a control, it is 
then possible to statistically sweep out their impact.  Again, let X0 and X1 be mean consumption 
by the target sub-group in the pre- and post- advisory periods respectively.  Similarly, let Y0 and 
Y1 be consumption by the non-target sub-group.  Then, 
1 0 common advisoryX X= + ∆ + ∆  
1 0 commonY Y= + ∆  
1 0 1 0( ) ( )advisory X X Y Y∆ = − − −  
It is irrelevant whether the initial average consumption levels X0 and Y0 differ across the two 
groups, so long as the common shock ∆common impacts both equally. If both the sub-group of 
interest and the reference group respond to some extent to the mercury advisory, the DDM 
approach identifies the relative difference in response to the advisory. In what follows, we make 
frequent use of this fact. For example, we measure the incremental impact of education on 
advisory response within the target sub-group.   
We use comparison tests in three ways. First, we compare unconditional difference-in-
differences means as discussed above. These statistics intuitively parallel the difference between 
the integrated area in the presented graph for the group of interest and the integrated area in the 
presented graph for the control group. Second, we apply these same comparisons to means 
                                                 
14 The graphical analog to this test, not presented in the interest of space but potentially useful for a reader’s 
intuition, is a “difference-in-differences” graph. We do present graphs side-by-side so that the reader can 
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conditional on consuming canned fish. Third, we apply analogous comparisons to the number of 
consumers purchasing any canned fish. For the three cases, relative to a control group the 
corresponding null hypotheses are: (1) No change in mean consumption, (2) No change in mean 
consumption, conditional on purchase, and (3) No change in the percent of the group purchasing 
any canned fish.  
Quantile Treatment Effects 
 
The methods described in the previous section emphasized changes in mean 
consumption. While the mean is important, comparisons only account for shifts in the central 
tendency of a distribution. One particular feature of interest here is behavior at the right tail of the 
consumption distribution, as this measures consumption of those considered most at-risk. In order 
to capture responses across the entire distribution of consumption, we use the quantile treatment 
effects (QTE) approach.  This method tests whether various quantiles of the consumption cdfs in 
pre- and post-advisory periods differ significantly.15 
As a concrete example, the 90th quantile is the smallest expenditure share such that at 
least 90% of households have lower shares.  Since consumption patterns may differ overall in the 
pre- and post-advisory periods, the 90th quantile expenditure share in the post-advisory period 
may differ from the 90th quantile share in the pre-advisory period.  The QTE  is the difference 
between these two expenditure shares; it measures the advisory “treatment”. Note that the QTE 
does not identify individual impacts because it does not measure changes by those specific 
individuals initially at a given quantile, an effect which would require perfect rank preservation 
(Heckman et al. (1997)). Rather a QTE reflects a shift in the overall consumption pattern across 
individuals, an impact of considerable importance from a public policy perspective.    
While the standard QTE analysis for our dataset provides a robust non-parametric check 
for shifts in consumption patterns, it only captures absolute changes, rather than changes relative 
                                                                                                                                                 
mentally make this comparison. 
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to a reference group. Thus, it does not control for potential common shocks.16 Following Meyer, 
Viscusi, and Durbin (1995), we adapt the classical difference-in-differences approach to provide 
the necessary correction. Thus, the corrected QTE is simply the difference between the QTE for 
the treatment group and the QTE for the baseline group. The underlying assumption is that 
common shocks impact the quantiles for the treatment and baseline groups to the same extent.17 
This pairing of two well-established methodologies provides a broad test for shifts in 
consumption patterns that is robust to the possibility of common shocks. 
We base our statistical inference for QTE’s on exact distribution-free quantile confidence 
intervals. From a probabilistic view, the question of whether a particular observation falls above 
or below some point is  is a Bernoulli trial. Conditional on is  being the q
th quantile, the 
probability that iK  shares out of T  total trials are less than is  is given by the binomial formula 
(1 )i iK T K
i
T
q q
K
−  −  
, where for example q = 0.9 for the 90th quantile. The confidence that the true 
quantile lies below a value is  is then 
1
(1 )
iK
k T k
k
T
q q
k
−
=
  −  ∑ . See Hogg and Craig (1978) p. 304 for 
a formal treatment. Confidence intervals for the final QTE’s are then constructed from these 
individual quantile confidence intervals. Recall that each difference-in-differences QTE involves 
observations from four groups. The probability that the QTE lies below a value t is evaluated by 
convolution over the quantile probabilities for each of those groups; see e.g. Poe et al. (1994).18 
That is, we evaluate each combination of quantiles over the grid of observed shares. We then 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Note that we present tests for a leftward shift in the cdf, which corresponds in a reduction in expenditure 
shares.  More commonly, studies test for rightward shifts.  See for example Maasoumi and Millimet (2005). 
16 If treatments are assigned randomly to a control and treatment group, the standard analysis suffices. The 
mercury advisory does not satisfy this condition as treatments are not randomly assigned and there are 
systematic initial differences between groups. 
17 In the difference-in-differences in means, X 1 – (Y 0 -Y 1 ) is sometimes interpreted as the predicted 
mean based only upon the common shock. One difficulty with this interpretation is that it is logically 
possible to produce negative mean consumption. The same issue arises here. In this broader context, it is 
possible that, after the QTE correction, the implied cdf may not be a proper cumulative distribution 
function. Thus, one must be careful not to over-interpret the underlying structure. 
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check whether the implied QTE, the difference-in-differences at that combination of points, is 
less than t. If so, we increment the probability that the QTE is less than t by the probability of that 
combination.19 In all tables of results, the presented significance values for the QTE’s correspond 
to a one-sided test. 
 
C. Regression Methods 
 
 We generalize the previous non-parametric DDM method with a standard regression 
analysis, consistent with the bulk of the mainstream demand literature. Moreover, to ensure the 
robustness of our results to indicators of consumption, we run a regression with quantity 
purchased as the dependent variable to supplement the previous analyses based on expenditure 
shares.20 
The main advantage of regression over the previous mean tests is that it controls for 
correlations between explanatory variables. In addition, traditional regression allows us to 
experiment with continuous definitions of the explanatory variables, rather than the dichotomous 
definitions necessary for graphs and the DDM’s which formalize them.  Note, however, that the 
fundamental identification approach of sweeping out common shocks in regression is still 
implicitly a difference-in-differences. 
The choice of explanatory variables is motivated by the conceptual framework in Section 
IIC. We include total food expenditure, region, household demographics, and factors that 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The method of Krinsky and Robb (1986) is a Monte Carlo approach to convolution.  
19 Since we are evaluating over a grid of observed points, we use the change in the quantile cdf at each 
gridpoint as a probability approximation. In other words, we act as if the data generating process were 
discrete, with support over the observed points. 
20 We perform complementary analyses with two different consumption indicators. Regressions use 
absolute quantities as the dependent variable. Non-parametric analyses use expenditure shares as the 
dependent variable. Since demand for canned fish is inelastic and price was lower after the advisory, one 
would expect expenditure shares to fall while quantities rise. While this may be a source of concern, the 
primary non-parametric difference-in-differences tests and the regression differences are both designed 
exactly to sweep out this type of common shock. Further, results across consumption indicators are similar. 
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influence perceived consumption risk due to health information.21 In all cases, since households 
vary in size, we demographically scale household composition covariates multiplicatively by the 
adult-equivalent measure discussed in Section III (Pollack and Wales, 1981).  
 Regressions are parameterized following the differences-in-differences literature.22 We 
include both the targeted dummy alone and interacted with the post-advisory dummy. We also 
allow the targeted treatment effect to differ by factors hypothesized to influence perceived risk. 
For example, we include education, education interacted with the target dummy, education 
interacted with the post-advisory dummy, and education interacted with both the post-advisory 
dummy and the target dummy. Our ultimate reference group is then non-targeted, non-reading, 
less educated, less healthy consumers. Time dummies for the pre- and post-advisory periods 
capture price and non-price shocks such as advertising for this reference group. 
As with many household expenditure datasets, we observe a large number of zero 
purchases. Here, zeros may arise in two ways. One possibility is infrequency of purchase, since a 
diary survey represents only a snapshot of a given household’s canned fish expenditure. A second 
possibility is abstention from the good entirely. To capture the dichotomous purchase choice, we 
begin the analysis with a standard probit regression. Of course, conditional on purchasing canned 
fish, we are also interested in the impact of the FDA warning on the quantity purchased. 
Therefore, we run a second stage continuous regression. We allow the same covariates to 
influence both the discrete purchase and the continuous quantity decision, but we do not impose 
cross-equation restrictions on the covariates of interest.  
The error term in this conditional demand equation is potentially correlated with the error 
term in the probit equation. In this case, our model is exactly that suggested by Blundell and 
                                                 
21 Recall that we assume the impact of prices and non-price shocks such as advertising is the same in the 
reference group and the group of interest.  Thus, prices and non-price shocks will be swept out of the 
difference-in-differences regressions.   
22 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrated that serial correlation may cause problems with 
inference from parametric difference-in-differences estimation. However, as a repeated cross-section, we 
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Meghir (1987) for the case of a good with non-negative desired demand.23  Mathematically, this 
is equivalent to Heckman’s (1976) selectivity model. See Deaton and Irish (1984) for a 
discussion, and Fry and Pashardes (1994) for an application. To summarize, our empirical model 
can be represented by: 
 
0
0 ,
C
D
Z X
D X
Z if D
Q
otherwise
β ε
ε
= +
= Γ +
>= 
 
 
for observed quantity Q, binary purchase decision D, continuous quantity choice Z, and 
explanatory variables X. 
We estimate two primary specifications. The first specification examines the entire 
sample, whereas the second specification highlights pre- versus post-advisory changes by 
removing the year immediately prior to and immediately after the advisory. We employ this latter 
specification to allow for potential lags in consumer responses.  
 
V. Empirical Results 
A. Advisory Response 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 2. Graphical results are presented in Figures 3-
6, and statistical test results are summarized in accompanying tables 3-6. We motivate our 
discussion of the results by asking a series of policy relevant questions. Sensitivity analysis 
follows in sub-section B.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have no individual based serial correlation. Further, one of their suggested remedies is to collapse time 
series information into pre-event and post-event time periods. Our analysis is structured this way. 
23 Another possible source of zero expenditures is the standard Tobit-style censoring where observation 
error may drive consumption to zero. We believe that this is not a major concern in our analysis. However, 
in the sensitivity section, we confirm that results are robust to this assumption. 
 22
Table 2. Difference-in-Differences Regression Results 
 
Binary Consumption            Quantity Conditional on              
        Decision                                      Consuming   
Variable Entire 
Sample 
Cored 
Sample 
Entire 
Sample 
Cored 
Sample 
     
FOOD EXPENDITURES  0.390** 0.431** 0.660** 0.738** 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.040) (0.063) 
AGE OF RESPONDENT 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CHILD (TARGETED)  0.065* -0.000 0.099* 0.057 
 (0.033) (0.046) (0.059) (0.081) 
CHILD*POST -0.041 0.017 -0.043 -0.007 
 (0.045) (0.068) (0.080) (0.108) 
READER 0.060* 0.047 0.084 0.099 
 (0.032) (0.044) (0.055) (0.077) 
READER*POST -0.101** -0.116* -0.151* -0.199* 
 (0.044) (0.064) (0.082) (0.111) 
EDUCATED -0.029 -0.039 -0.020 -0.023 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.061) (0.080) 
EDUCATED*POST 0.054 0.055 0.104 0.036 
 (0.048) (0.064) (0.083) (0.111) 
HEALTHY 0.010 -0.007 0.003 -0.030 
 (0.039) (0.055) (0.070) (0.100) 
HEALTHY*POST -0.043 -0.053 -0.016 -0.032 
 (0.054) (0.076) (0.096) (0.136) 
READER*CHILD -0.079* -0.056 -0.132* -0.153 
 (0.046) (0.064) (0.078) (0.109) 
READER*CHILD*POST 0.041 0.033 0.069 0.108 
 (0.069) (0.095) (0.117) (0.164) 
EDUCATED*CHILD 0.034 0.089 0.052 0.138 
 (0.048) (0.067) (0.082) (0.114) 
EDUCATED*CHILD*POST -0.111* -0.210** -0.229** -0.378** 
 (0.069) (0.096) (0.117) (0.167) 
HEALTHY*CHILD 0.015 -0.023 0.068 0.026 
 (0.052) (0.077) (0.092) (0.141) 
HEALTHY*CHILD*POST 0.039 0.159 -0.037 0.139 
 (0.075) (0.108) (0.132) (0.200) 
PRE-ADVISORY DUMMY -0.437** -0.399** -0.889** -0.884** 
 (0.065) (0.087) (0.117) (0.150) 
POST-ADVISORY DUMMY -0.397** -0.394** -0.803** -0.798** 
 (0.063) (0.087) (0.113) (0.148) 
TIME INVARIANT CONS. -0.633** -0.615** - - 
 (0.058) (0.093)   
     
 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.     ** - Significant at α = .05     * - Significant at α = .10.  
Both regression specifications use a maximum likelihood procedure mathematically identical to Heckman’s 
Selectivity model. Specifications also include 4-1 regional dummies and 4-1 race dummies, but we omit 
these control results to conserve space. 
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Did the target group respond to the FDA advisory? 
 
Taken as a whole, it appears that households with young or nursing children responded to 
the advisory relative to non-target households, but the statistical evidence is modest. Panel A of 
Figure 3 shows a general reduction for the target group at most expenditure share levels. Recall 
that the integrated area between the difference curve and the horizontal axis is equal to the 
difference in means. Here, the net integrated area is negative; the sample mean clearly fell after 
the advisory for this group. In contrast, Panel B shows a slight increase for the non-target control 
group. Comparing Panel B to Panel A, we see that mean expenditure share for the target group 
fell relative to the non-target group.24   
 
Figure 3. Difference Graphs: Target and Non-Target Groups 
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               Panel A                    Panel B 
 
                                                 
24 All difference graphs are presented up until the 98th quantile. Beyond this quantile, statistical noise 
predominates. 
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Table 3. Non-Parametric Tests Summary:  Target and Non-Target Groups25  
 
 %∆  
Mean 
Share 
%∆ Mean 
Share, Given 
Positive Share   
%∆ Fraction of 
Consumers with 
Positive Share 
 
Q80? 
 
Q85? 
 
Q90? 
 
Q95? 
        
Target, Net of  
  Non-Target 
-21.8 
(0.08) 
-13.0 
(0.17) 
-9.7 
(0.13) 
No 
(.24) 
No 
(.12) 
Yes 
(.05) 
Yes 
(.10 ) 
        
P-values are in parentheses. Quantile Treatment Effects evaluated at α=0.10. 
 
The difference-in-difference of means (DDM) statistic is the normalized numerical value 
of the difference in means for the target group, net of mean changes for the non-target group 
(here, the reference group). The net drop in the overall mean expenditure share allocated to fish 
for the target group was 21.8 percent. The corresponding DDM statistic is statistically different 
from zero at the 8 percent significance level.  
While the overall mean fell, the disaggregated components of this mean did not fall 
significantly when considered individually. Neither the percent drop in net share conditional on 
purchase nor the percent drop in the net proportion of households purchasing is significant at 
conventional levels. Similarly, the quantile treatment effect results are modest. We find evidence 
of significant quantile treatment effects above the 90th percentile. At Q90 and Q95, more than 90 
percent of the test statistic’s confidence distribution lies below 0. Thus, after accounting for 
common shocks to non-target groups, target consumers’ total expenditure on fish fell 
significantly across this range of the distribution. 
The parametric regression results in Table 2 are also suggestive, but frequently 
insignificant. The coefficient on the child*post-advisory interaction represents the impact of the 
advisory for targeted, non-reading, less educated, less healthy consumers, relative to the pre-
advisory baseline for this group. The aggregate impact of the advisory on targeted consumers is 
the joint impact of the coefficients on child*post, education*child*post, reader*child*post, and 
                                                 
25 To enhance the economic interpretation, Tables 3-6 report percent changes for mean expenditure share, 
mean expenditure share conditional on consuming, and proportion of group purchasing any fish. The actual 
test statistics, however, are based upon absolute differences rather than percents. 
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healthy*child*post. Only in the full sample continuous quantity regression are these four 
coefficients jointly significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Did health-conscious consumers respond to the advisory? 
 
 No. We find no evidence that health-conscious households, as a group, responded to the 
advisory. Recall that we define healthy households by a function of good diet and tobacco 
abstinence. Panel A of Figure 4 illustrates the change in expenditure patterns for healthy 
households in the non-target group, while Panel B represents less healthy households in the non-
target group. In Panel A, we do not observe a consistent pattern. In Panel B, the net integrated 
area is relatively small. On balance, there is little change in mean expenditure behavior among 
non-targeted households. Panels C and D of Figure 4 represent expenditure changes by healthy 
and less healthy target groups, respectively. While both panels show a reduction in mean 
expenditure by targeted groups, a clear differential response among healthy and less healthy 
target consumers is not apparent. 
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Figure 4. Difference Graphs: Healthy and Less Healthy Groups 
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Table 4. Non-Parametric Tests Summary:  Healthy and Less Healthy Groups 
 
 %∆  
Mean 
Share 
%∆ Mean 
Share, Given 
Positive Share   
%∆ Fraction of 
Consumers with 
Positive Share 
 
Q80? 
 
Q85? 
 
Q90? 
 
Q95? 
        
Non-Target: Healthy, 
Net of Less Healthy 
-13.2 
(0.27) 
-6.4 
(0.36) 
-7.2 
(0.30) 
No 
(.39) 
No 
(.32) 
No 
(.27) 
No 
(.11) 
Target: Healthy, Net 
of Less Healthy 
-16.8 
(0.22) 
-14.6 
(0.20) 
-1.8 
(0.44) 
No 
(.34) 
No 
(.16) 
No 
(.44) 
No 
(.28) 
Healthy: Target, Net 
of Non-Target 
-18.8 
(0.26) 
-14.6 
(0.29) 
-6.5 
(0.36) 
No 
(.33) 
No 
(.20) 
No 
(.25) 
No 
(.50) 
Less Healthy: Target, 
Net of Non-Target 
-21.7 
(0.12) 
-11.5 
(0.24) 
-10.5 
(0.15) 
No 
(.33) 
No 
(.13) 
No 
(.11) 
No 
(.12) 
        
P-values are in parentheses. Quantile Treatment Effects evaluated at α=0.10. 
 
Non-parametric statistical tests confirm the visual insights. Among non-targeted 
consumers, the DDM statistic for the percent change in the overall mean expenditure share for the 
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healthy subgroup (after accounting for mean changes for the less healthy subgroup) is not 
significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.27). The corresponding overall DDM statistic is 
also not statistically significant for the target group (p-value of 0.22). All other non-parametric 
DDM statistics are similar. Neither the healthy group’s net mean share conditional on purchase 
nor the healthy group’s net proportion of consumers purchasing any fish changes significantly, 
regardless of whether the particular households are targeted or non-targeted. These findings are 
not restricted to the mean; we find no evidence of significant quantile treatment effects for all 
tested percentiles. 
Regression results are consistent with these findings. In Table 2, the row labeled 
‘Healthy*Post’ indicates no significant impact of the advisory among health conscious non-
targeted consumers. Similarly, we find no significant incremental advisory response from target 
group membership for health-conscious households, as summarized in the interaction row labeled 
‘Healthy*Child*Post.’ 
Did readers respond to the advisory? 
 
Yes. Households purchasing newspapers or magazines reduced fish expenditure shares 
after the advisory. Panel A of Figure 5 indicates that shares fell after the advisory among readers 
in the non-target group. In contrast, Panel B shows that expenditure shares rose among non-
targeted non-readers. Thus, non-target readers’ share fell considerably after netting out changes to 
non-target non-readers. Panels C and D of Figure 5 represent changes in share by reading and 
non-reading target consumers, respectively. While both panels indicate a reduction in post-
advisory expenditure shares, it appears that targeted readers responded somewhat more than 
targeted non-readers. Collectively, the figures suggest a fall in post-advisory shares for readers 
and a differential response among readers and non-readers.   
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Figure 5. Difference Graphs: Reading and Non-Reading Groups 
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Table 5. Non-Parametric Tests Summary:  Reading and Non-Reading Groups 
 
 %∆  
Mean 
Share 
%∆ Mean 
Share, Given 
Positive Share   
%∆ Fraction of 
Consumers with 
Positive Share 
 
Q80? 
 
Q85? 
 
Q90? 
 
Q95? 
        
Non-Target: Readers, 
Net of Non-Readers 
-28.6 
(0.06) 
+5.9 
(0.64) 
-30.7 
(0.01) 
No 
(.28) 
Yes 
(.03) 
Yes 
(.06) 
Yes 
(.07) 
Target: Readers, Net 
of Non-Readers 
-19.1 
(0.19) 
-5.6 
(0.36) 
-15.9 
(0.15) 
No 
(.40) 
No 
(.17) 
No 
(.32) 
No 
(.41) 
Reading: Target, Net 
of Non-Target 
-7.6 
(0.39) 
-25.2 
(0.13) 
+0.9 
(0.51) 
No 
(.45) 
No 
(.57) 
No 
(.46) 
No 
(.67) 
Non-Reading: Target, 
Net of Non-Target 
-25.4 
(0.08) 
-8.3 
(0.30) 
-12.9 
(0.09) 
No 
(.29) 
Yes 
(.05) 
Yes 
(.03) 
Yes 
(.06) 
        
P-values are in parentheses. Quantile Treatment Effects evaluated at α=0.10. 
 
The non-parametric tests confirm the visual evidence. Among non-targeted consumers, 
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the drop in the overall mean expenditure share allocated to fish for the reading group (net of mean 
changes for the non-reading group) was 28.6 percent. The corresponding DDM statistic is 
statistically different from zero at the 6 percent level. Most of the change is attributable to 
changes in the number of consumers; the net proportion of non-target readers consuming any fish 
fell more than 30 percent (p-value of 0.01), while the net share conditional on purchase remained 
relatively constant. Results are not restricted to the means of the expenditure share distributions; 
we find evidence of significant quantile treatment effects for percentiles above Q85. Results for 
the smaller target subgroup are less pronounced; all DDM statistics are not statistically different 
from zero.  
It may initially seem curious that the marginal impact of reading is more significant 
among the non-targeted than among the targeted. However, the baseline comparison for targeted 
consumers should already be lower than the baseline comparison for non-targeted consumers. In 
other words, some of the targeted respond despite being non-readers, while few of the non-
targeted do so. Further, among readers, we cannot reject the hypothesis that target and non-target 
groups respond in the same way. 
 Among non-readers, the drop in the overall mean expenditure share for the target group 
(net of mean changes for the non-target group) was a statistically significant 25.4 percent. Results 
are not restricted to the mean, as quantile treatment effects above Q85 are significant at 10 
percent levels. Share changes among target groups, relative to non-targeted groups, are not 
significant for readers. This latter result may initially seem puzzling. However, the result is 
consistent with the pronounced spillover effects detected above. Non-targeted readers 
significantly reduce their consumption, despite not being considered at-risk by the advisory. 
Consequently, the baseline comparison for the impact of target membership among readers is 
already lower than the baseline comparison for the impact of target membership among non-
readers. 
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 Regression coefficients support this analysis. Looking at Table 2, we see that the 
‘Reader*Post’ row indicates a consistently significant impact of the advisory among non-targeted 
readers. However, the ‘Reader*Child*Post’ row reflects no incremental impact of being in the 
targeted group on readers. Therefore, we find that readers, as a group, reduced expenditure after 
the advisory relative to non-readers. However, there is no detected difference among readers 
across the target and non-target groups.26 
 
Did educated households respond to the advisory? 
 
Yes. Educated households responded strongly, but only if they are in the target group. 
First, consider Panels A and B of Figure 6.  Neither educated nor less educated non-target 
households seem to substantially change expenditure shares, since the net integrated areas are 
quite small in each graph. In contrast, Panel C shows a sharp drop in shares among educated 
households with young or nursing children. Panel D shows little change for less-educated 
households with young or nursing children.  Comparing Panel C to D suggests a very strong 
impact of education for the response of the target group relative to the non-target group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Both parametric and non-parametric results may be biased if readership and fish consumption are joint 
consumption decisions in an economically meaningful way. For example, suppose households purchase 
newspapers and magazines primarily to find out about food safety. Our working assumption is that such 
joint decisions represent, at most, a small portion of readership and should not bias results. Further, our data 
suggests this concern is perhaps not practically important here; for both target and non-target consumers, 
news readership remains relatively constant across periods. 
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Figure 6. Difference Graphs: Educated and Less Educated Groups 
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Table 6. Non-Parametric Tests Summary:  Educated and Less Educated Groups 
 
 %∆  
Mean 
Share 
%∆ Mean 
Share, Given 
Positive Share   
%∆ Fraction of 
Consumers with 
Positive Share 
 
Q80? 
 
Q85? 
 
Q90? 
 
Q95? 
        
Non-Target: Educated, 
Net of Less Educated 
-1.5 
(0.49) 
-6.2 
(0.35) 
+4.2 
(0.64) 
No 
(.47) 
No 
(.48) 
No 
(.51) 
No 
(.32) 
Target: Educated, Net 
of Less Educated 
-50.2 
(0.01) 
-43.2 
(0.01) 
-13.5 
(0.17) 
No 
(.27) 
Yes 
(.02) 
Yes 
(.01) 
Yes 
(.01) 
Educated: Target, Net 
of Non-Target 
-51.2 
(0.02) 
-34.3 
(0.06) 
-20.4 
(0.07) 
No 
(.21) 
Yes 
(.03) 
Yes 
(.01) 
Yes 
(.10) 
Less Educated: Target, 
Net of Non-Target 
-3.4 
(0.43) 
-0.5 
(0.49) 
-4.3 
(0.34) 
No 
(.32) 
No 
(.36) 
No 
(.48) 
No 
(.52) 
        
P-values are in parentheses. Quantile Treatment Effects evaluated at α=0.10. 
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Statistical tests once again support the graphical analyses. Among non-targeted 
consumers, the DDM statistic for the percent change in the overall mean expenditure share for the 
educated subgroup (net of mean changes for the less educated subgroup) is not significant at 
conventional levels (p-value of 0.49). Further, none of the non-parametric tests indicate any 
differential response among educated non-target consumers and less educated non-target 
consumers. In contrast, among target consumers, the drop in overall mean expenditure share 
allocated to fish in the educated group (net of changes for the less educated group) was more than 
50 percent (p-value of 0.01). The fall is attributable to changes in both the proportion of at-risk 
educated consumers that purchase at all and shares conditional on consuming. Results are robust 
across the distributions; we find evidence of strongly significant quantile treatment effects above 
Q80.  
Regression results tell a similar story. In Table 2, the interaction row labeled 
‘Educated*Child*Post’ presents evidence about the impact of education on response patterns of 
targeted households, beyond any impact on educated non-target households. For both 
specifications, we find a statistically significant effect for both the number of consumers and the 
mean quantity. Educated households with young or nursing children strongly reduced 
consumption after the advisory, relative to the control group. Contrast these results to the row 
labeled ‘Educated*Post,’ which indicates the advisory response among non-targeted educated 
households was insignificant. 
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B. Sensitivity Analysis  
Single Differences  
 
 The primary non-parametric and parametric results in the previous section emphasize 
differential consumption changes between two groups. For example, we find a differential 
response between target and non-target consumers, readers and non-readers (whether targeted or 
not), and educated and less educated consumers (if targeted). The motivation for differential 
responses is robustness to common shocks. 
However, sharper results can be obtained by assuming the unobserved common shocks 
are small on average. An additional benefit of this assumption is that estimated response 
magnitudes are absolute and more readily interpretable. In practice, imposing this restriction 
amounts to performing single difference non-parametric tests, without reference to a control 
group. 
Single difference statistical test (SDM) results are presented in Table 7.27 The most 
important feature is that the single difference results closely resemble the difference-in-
differences results, so unobserved shocks are likely small on average. For responding groups, 
post-advisory consumption fell, both absolutely and relative to control groups. Non-target 
readers’ mean expenditure share fell by approximately one-fourth (DDM 28.6%, SDM 13.7%), 
target readers’ mean share fell on the order of one-fifth (DDM 19.1%, SDM 27.7%), and the 
target educated groups’ mean share fell by approximately one-half (DDM 50.2%, SDM 43.6%). 
The similarity between single difference and difference-in-differences results also 
suggests that there is no meaningful advisory response among those groups with statistically 
undetected consumption changes. Of course, this depends upon the power of the tests. For those 
least likely to be knowledgeable about the advisory (the non-reading, less educated group 
examined the in last rows of Table 7), we find an insignificant response. Tests of power at the 90 
                                                 
27 We also ran the corresponding single difference parametric regressions. These regressions included 
observable potential time variant shocks like prices and substitute prices, but omitted time-varying 
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percent confidence level reveal that this group’s overall mean expenditure share decrease is less 
than 13 percent, their mean share decrease conditional on fish purchase is less than 12 percent, 
and their mean fall in the proportion of consumers purchasing any fish is less than 8 percent.28 In 
other words, changes for this uninformed group are relatively small, if not precisely zero. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
constants. Results were consistent with both the difference-in-differences regression results and the non-
parametric single difference results.  
28 Difference-in-differences results and analyses, not reported in the interest of space, are similar. 
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Table 7. Non-Parametric Tests Summary:  Single Differences 
 
 %∆  Mean Share %∆ Mean 
Share, Given 
Positive Share    
%∆ Fraction of 
Consumers with 
Positive Share 
    
Target and Non-Target    
Target Group -11.3 
(0.14) 
-4.1 
(0.31) 
-7.5 
(0.15) 
Non-Target Group +8.8 
(0.82) 
+5.9 
(0.78) 
+2.8 
(0.68) 
    
Healthy and Less Healthy    
Non-Target Group: Healthy -2.6 
(0.46) 
+0.3 
(0.52) 
-2.9 
(0.40) 
Non-Target Group: Less Healthy +12.4 
(0.87) 
+7.6 
(0.81) 
+4.4 
(0.75) 
Target Group: Healthy -21.7 
(0.14) 
-14.1 
(0.19) 
-8.9 
(0.26) 
Target Group: Less Healthy -6.5 
(0.31) 
+0.6 
(0.53) 
-7.0 
(0.21) 
    
Reading and Non-Reading    
Non-Target Group: Readers -13.7 
(0.18) 
+9.4 
(0.77) 
-21.1 
(0.02) 
Non-Target Group: Non-Readers +16.4 
(0.91) 
+2.8 
(0.63) 
+13.2 
(0.96) 
Target Group: Readers -27.7 
(0.05) 
-10.7 
(0.17) 
-19.0 
(0.08) 
Target Group: Non-Readers -7.2 
(0.29) 
-4.0 
(0.34) 
-3.3 
(0.34) 
    
Educated and Less Educated    
Non-Target Group: Educated +6.7 
(0.65) 
+1.1 
(0.54) 
+5.6 
(0.70) 
Non-Target Group: Less 
Educated 
+9.6 
(0.80) 
+8.0 
(0.82) 
+1.5 
(0.58) 
Target Group: Educated -43.6 
(0.01) 
-32.7 
(0.01) 
-16.2 
(0.09) 
Non-Target Group: Less 
Educated 
+8.4 
(0.72) 
+11.8 
(0.86) 
-3.1 
(0.36) 
    
Non-Reading and Less Educated    
Non-Target Group: Less 
Educated Non-Readers 
+16.0 
(0.87) 
+3.0 
(0.62) 
+12.6 
(0.92) 
Target Group:  Less Educated 
Non-Readers 
+14.2 
(0.78) 
+10.1 
(0.79) 
+3.7 
(0.63) 
    
p-values in parentheses 
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Sensitivity to Other Assumptions 
 
The results of the preceding sections are consistent across both single-difference and 
difference-in-differences graphical, non-parametric, and regression analyses. Below, we provide 
evidence these results are robust to choices of proxy-variable definitions, model structure, error 
specification, and the precise nature of the ‘event’. 
 When the threshold for “educated” is defined as a college degree, we found a strong 
differential response compared to less educated target consumers. Increasing the threshold to 
some graduate education amplifies this difference. However, upon decreasing the threshold to 
high school graduation, the difference with the less educated group is no longer statistically 
significant. 
 Our definition of ‘health conscious’ is ad hoc. However, results are not sensitive to the 
construction of the proxy variable. A wide variety of plausible indices and thresholds were 
considered without finding any differential response between healthy and unhealthy consumers. 
Our regression model assumes a mean-zero error, implying that the sample average is a 
consistent estimate of true market demand. If zero-censoring of the dependent variable due to 
observation error is a concern, a Tobit correction would be in order. Therefore, we tested a 
supplementary Cragg (1971) correlated double-hurdle model to address this concern. The results 
for this specification were quite similar to those reported.  
 Another possible concern is the sharpness of our study’s ‘event’ (the January 2001 
advisory). For example, perhaps consumers were broadly aware of concerns about mercury 
exposure prior to the announcement, since a number of states had issued advisories for 
recreational fish before the FDA action. One might also be concerned that the possibility of a 
FDA advisory was widely publicized long before its actual release. However, experiments 
indicate that these concerns are unsupported. For example, we do not find differential responses 
between those in the eight states that issued their own commercial advisories and those in other 
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states. Further, target groups’ expenditures remained unchanged or increased between each of 
pre-advisory years (1997/1998, 1998/1999, 1999/2000). We also detected no systematically 
differential response among educated and uneducated target consumers (the most divergent 
groups in our analysis) prior to the advisory itself. 
There are other sound reasons to believe the event is properly defined. First, the FDA 
issued the advisory within months of initially considering action. Second, FDA focus groups 
conducted in October 2000 (two months before the advisory) indicated, “None of the [focus] 
groups showed much interest or concern about mercury as a hazard in fish before seeing the 
information pieces….There was little or no awareness in any group of a hazard due to low level 
mercury exposure from fish consumption that was not due to a specific [localized] pollution 
problem.” (FDA 2000) Finally, if consumers had already reacted to the mercury hazard, it would 
be difficult to reconcile the observed differential responses after the advisory between educated 
and less educated consumers.  
 
VI. Discussion & Conclusion 
 
We find that some targeted consumers significantly reduced canned fish purchases as a 
result of the FDA mercury advisory of January 2001. In particular, college educated consumers in 
the target group responded strongly. Among households with young and nursing children, mean 
canned fish expenditure share fell by approximately 50 percent after the advisory, accounting for 
common shocks. In marked contrast, we detected no statistically significant response among 
those with less education.   
We found that newspaper or magazine purchases were associated with a significant 
reduction in post-advisory consumption. Among households that purchased newspapers or 
magazines in the diary period, mean fish expenditure fell by 19 percent after the advisory, 
accounting for common shocks. However, we found no differential response among targeted 
readers and non-targeted readers.   
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Access to information and the ability to assimilate information were important limiting 
factors in the advisory response. We view newspaper readership as a reasonable proxy for 
exposure to information about the dangers of mercury in fish, and readers responded. We also 
view college education as a reasonable proxy for the ability to assimilate information 
appropriately, and educated individuals responded only if targeted by the advisory.  
Can the observed changes in consumption be attributed to the FDA policy? The 
responses are consistent with increased information about mercury hazards. Further, FDA focus 
groups found no public awareness of the relevant risks two months prior to the advisory. 
Although we do not know whether individual responding consumers were aware of the advisory 
per se, there is no doubt that the advisory resulted in much greater general public awareness of 
mercury risk. In this sense, an advisory can achieve the issuing agency’s goals through promoting 
awareness, even if indirectly. 
Targeted consumers likely to be aware of and understand the advisory tended to reduce 
fish consumption. So, mercury advisories and education programs can achieve policy goals like 
reducing the contaminant exposure of nursing and young children. However, those at-risk 
consumers least likely to be knowledgeable about the advisory do not significantly reduce 
consumption. Notably, this large group of non-college educated, non-readers is also likely to be 
poorly equipped to withstand negative health shocks. At a minimum, these latter results suggest 
that a broader and more targeted educational outreach program may be necessary to reach many 
vulnerable members of society. Possible enhanced outreach methods include health-advertising 
campaigns (on public transportation, for example), in-store advisory signs, and mandatory 
product labeling. Mathios (2000) showed that labeling induces important consumption responses, 
and Teisl et al. (2002) showed that point of consumption labeling is particularly effective for 
canned fish.29  
                                                 
29 Teisl et al. (2002) examined the impact of “dolphin-safe” eco-labeling on tuna consumption. 
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More broadly, we find that well-informed consumers actively respond to environmental 
risk warnings. Prominent advisories can be an effective and low-cost means of achieving policy 
goals. However, particular attention must be paid to less educated and less informed consumers. 
On another cautionary note, our results also indicate that informed individuals may respond more 
broadly than intended, as non-targeted readers reduced fish consumption after the mercury 
advisory. While this may be a rational or even optimal response, it is not consistent with the 
stated intent of the advisory. Therefore, advisories and outreach programs should be carefully 
crafted with such spillovers in mind. 
This paper suggests promising avenues for future research that are beyond the present 
scope. First, what is the social value of information based policies? Second, given this value, how 
do advisories compare to other policy options for managing mercury exposure? Advisories may 
significantly reduce exposure. However, a full welfare analysis requires evaluating the accuracy 
of the advisory’s underlying scientific information. This paper identifies how consumers 
responded to a prominent advisory, but does not purport to assess the validity of that advisory’s 
content. Further, there are a number of subtle theoretical issues in developing an accurate 
empirical estimate of the benefits of demand-side mitigation. These welfare questions form a 
critical element of an ongoing research agenda in this area.  
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